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This paper contributes to the debate on how New Zealand
should meet commitments under the Framework Convention
on Climate Change (FCCC) to mitigate greenhouse gas
emissions. It is a technical paper, setting out how a carbon charge
could be implemented, if the Government were to decide to do
so. The release of the paper should not be read as a commitment
by the Government to the introduction of a carbon charge as it
has decided to defer until early 1998 a decision on whether a
low-level carbon charge or some other method of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions should be introduced. There are a
number of options available to New Zealand to meet our climate
change commitments. A carbon charge is only one of them. The
Government remains committed to voluntary agreements by
industry to reduce emissions in the meantime.
In 1994, the former Government took a series of forward-looking
decisions on dealing with emissions of greenhouse gases. At the
time, specific measures concentrated on the mitigation of carbon
dioxide emissions. However, the previous Government also
recognised that other greenhouse gases, such as methane,
formed a significant part of New Zealand’s emission profile, and
forests constituted a substantial opportunity for absorbing carbon
from the atmosphere. The 1994 policy provided for a decision,
in June 1997, for the introduction of a low-level carbon charge,
if New Zealand was not on track to achieve the target to which
it had committed. However, during the intervening period the
international context has shifted.
Since the beginning of the Berlin Mandate process in 1995, Parties
to the FCCC have been meeting to discuss the extent and form
of international action to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions post-
2000. As part of this process, participating Annex 1 countries
(essentially developed countries) agreed at the second meeting
of the Conference of Parties in July 1996 to negotiate legally
binding targets. This means that Annex 1 countries will be
required to meet the commitments set out in the protocol,
expected to be agreed in Kyoto, Japan in December 1997.
Ministerial
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MINISTERIAL PREFACE
The former Government’s commitments of 1994 (which included
the possible introduction of a low-level carbon charge) are
consistent with the international non-binding aim to stabilise
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases at 1990 levels by
2000. Emissions restraint targets have proved to be more difficult
and costly to meet than previously anticipated. This experience
makes it clear that, in considering how to meet any future
commitments, it is important to make sure that the means
employed are as efficient and least-cost as possible.
The timing of an agreement in Kyoto at the end of 1997 and the
developments taking place in international negotiations make
it sensible for New Zealand to defer making a decision on the
introduction of a carbon charge until early in 1998. At that
time the international context will be better known, along with
the size and nature of future commitments. The Government
will then be in a position to assess other possible measures such
as tradeable carbon emission permits. In this light, the sections
of the working paper on design principles, coverage and
determining carbon content have a more general application to
other instruments that might be implemented to meet
New Zealand’s future commitments.
It is expected that the Government will release a paper
examining the technical issues associated with a permit trading
regime during the year, as this is the other major instrument
available to the Government to meet future commitments at
least cost.
Hon Winston Peters Hon Simon Upton
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for the
Treasurer EnvironmentA WORKING PAPER  3
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Introduction
This Working Paper1 describes a possible design for a low-level
charge on the use of carbon leading to carbon dioxide CO2
emissions in New Zealand.
It does not discuss whether or not New Zealand should introduce
such a charge; what the rate of a carbon charge might be; or
what the revenues from a carbon charge could be used for. These
issues will be considered by the Government in early 1998.
Instead, it addresses:
• the context and objective of a possible carbon charge;
• design principles;
• coverage;
• administrative issues; and
• legislative issues.
Context and objectives
A carbon charge is a policy option available to New Zealand to
reduce national CO2 emissions as part of an international
response to climate change caused by greenhouse gases. The
scope and nature of the international response to climate change
will be clearer in early 1998 when the outcomes of the current
negotiations on commitments beyond 2000 will be known.
The objective of a carbon charge would be to reduce CO2
emissions in New Zealand by increasing the price of carbon,
thereby changing people’s behaviour. Unlike most taxes, its aim
would not be to gather revenue. Rather, it would be an example
of the kind of tax that aims to price environmental costs into
activities or substances that have adverse environmental effects,
so that the prices of these activities and substances more
accurately reflect the costs they impose on society.
Executive
Summary
1 This Working Paper has been
developed by officials from the
Treasury, Ministry of
Commerce, Ministry for the
Environment, Inland Revenue
Department and New Zealand
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Design principles
The design canvassed in this working paper involves taxing the
sources of carbon rather than the emissions themselves. This is
because the carbon content of the sources is a good indicator of
the amount of CO2 emitted, and the large number of emitters
would make the direct taxation of emissions impractical.
For cost-efficiency reasons, this working paper suggests a low-
level carbon charge that would be a ‘one-sided’, rather than a
‘two-sided’ instrument; that is, it would tax emissions but would
not make payments for absorption.
Like alcohol and tobacco taxes, a charge would mean that the
price of the substance would incorporate some part of the
unpriced cost to society caused by its use. A charge would thus
be consistent with the government’s general principles of tax
policy.
This working paper suggests that the preferred approach to
designing a carbon charge would be to apply a charge at a
uniform rate across all emitters in the economy. This would
impose lower costs on New Zealand than it would if there were
different rates for some emitters. This is because:
• emitters would have an equal incentive to find and apply the
lowest-cost methods for reducing their emissions, so that these
methods would be applied first throughout the economy; and
• all emitters would have the same incentives to use all potential
methods of reducing emissions, encouraging a mix of
voluntary, lowest-cost responses across industries.
A charge would be added to the price of the product, which
would then be subject to GST, and would be a deductible expense
in businesses’ liability for income tax.
Coverage
This paper suggests that a charge would cover:
• the production and importation of fossil fuels; and
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•C O 2 sources not associated with fossil fuels (that is, certain
industrial processes and the extraction of steam from
geothermal fields for electricity generation).
Where CO2  is emitted outside New Zealand or is “fixed” in a
non-emitting form, rebates2 or refunds would apply.
Administrative issues
The administration of a carbon charge would, preferably, link
into the operations of an existing agency. Administrative
functions would include:
• determining the carbon content of products subject to a
charge;
• setting the point at which liability for a charge and eligibility
for refunds or rebates arises;
• the handling of payments, refunds and rebates; and
• auditing and enforcement, with a focus on encouraging
compliance and minimising compliance costs.
Legislative issues
Legislation would be needed to enact a carbon charge. It would
preferably take the form of a stand-alone Act, but would draw
as far as possible on administrative provisions in existing tax
law in matters such as auditing and enforcement. As a result,
the legislation would be relatively compact.
The rate of a charge and the criteria for coverage would be set
in legislation; the precise coverage and administrative details
would be contained in regulations.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
2 Where the person exporting or
“fixing” the carbon was also the
carbon producer, a rebate would
apply. The amount would be
offset against payments made. In
all other cases, a refund would
apply. 8    A WORKING PAPER A WORKING PAPER  9
Context
A carbon charge is one option available to New Zealand to
reduce national CO2 emissions, as part of an international
response to climate change caused by greenhouse gases. Given
the importance of the international negotiations and recent
developments in this area, the Government has deferred a
decision on whether to introduce a carbon charge until early
1998.
CO2 emissions have been the main focus of attention in
international negotiations because, worldwide, CO2 is the main
greenhouse gas. The emissions result primarily from the
combustion of fossil fuels and from certain industrial processes.
The New Zealand Government is a signatory to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC),
which aims to stabilise atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse
gases at a level that avoids dangerous anthropogenic3 interference
with the climate. There is not yet a consensus on what that level
may be. One of the aims of the convention is for developed
countries like New Zealand to return their emissions of CO2 and
other greenhouse gases to 1990 levels by the year 20004. An
international process is under way to develop legally-binding
targets for emission reductions, and to make other commitments
for the period beyond 2000, by December 1997.
New Zealand’s actions are part of a global commitment to reduce
emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases. Co-ordinated
international action on climate change will strongly influence
our domestic actions. The Government is monitoring
international developments - in particular, proposals for
emissions trading. New Zealand is also contributing to the
international debate on approaches to lowering the costs of
achieving any given level of reductions in greenhouse gas
emissions.
The sections of the working paper on design principles, coverage
and determining carbon content have a more general application
to other instruments that might be implemented to meet
New Zealand’s future commitments.
Context and
Objectives
3 ’Anthropogenic’ means resulting
directly from human activities or
from natural processes that have
been affected by human
activities.
4 At present, the convention does
not set an emissions reduction
target for developing countries. 10    A WORKING PAPER 
Objectives
The objective of a carbon charge would be to reduce CO2
emissions in New Zealand by increasing the price of the
emissions. It would achieve this by increasing the price of the
goods and services containing carbon released into the
atmosphere. Effectively, the price of carbon would rise. Unlike
most taxes, a charge on carbon would not be intended to gather
revenue. Rather, it would be an example of the kind of tax that
aims to price environmental costs into activities or substances
that have adverse environmental effects, so that the prices of
these activities and substances more accurately reflect the costs
they impose on society.
CONTEXT AND OBJECTIVESA WORKING PAPER  11
Summary
Under the preferred approach, a carbon charge would be levied
on carbon as a proxy for CO2 emissions. Ideally, therefore, it
would cover all sources of carbon that would be released as
CO2 in New Zealand. All other carbon sources would be exempt.
A charge would be a ‘one-sided instrument’, not a ‘two-sided
instrument’; that is, emissions would be taxed, but payments
would not be made for absorption.
As with any tax, economic efficiency, simplicity, fairness and
certainty are important principles in the design.
A uniform charge across all anthropogenic carbon sources that
result in CO2 emissions in New Zealand would minimise the cost
involved in achieving a desired level of emission reductions in
New Zealand.
Carbon as a proxy for CO2 emissions
It could be argued that, because a charge would be aimed at
reducing CO2 emissions, it should be levied on the emissions
themselves. The choice between taxing CO2 emissions directly
and taxing carbon-containing substances as a proxy for their
CO2 emissions depends on the cost and feasibility of monitoring
CO2 emissions, and on how good a proxy carbon content is for
CO2 emissions.
CO2 emissions are from numerous and diverse sources; it would
be impractical to impose a tax on emissions from every factory
chimney and vehicle exhaust. Taxing the comparatively few
sources of carbon would be considerably cheaper. However,
doing this would be efficient only if there is a direct and stable
link between the sources and the CO2 emissions. In fact, there
is, in general5, a stable proportional relationship between the
carbon content of CO2-emitting substances and the quantity of
CO2 emitted. Therefore, the carbon content of the substances is,
in general, a good proxy for the emissions.6
The relationship between the carbon content of a substance and
the amount of CO2 emitted per unit of energy generated from
that substance is called the “emission factor”. The emission factor
5 Sources of CO
2 emissions that are
not associated with fossil fuels
are an exception (see “Exclusions
from a carbon charge”,  page 26).
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would be converted into a rate per unit of each CO2-emitting
substance, using whatever is the standard unit of measurement
for each substance (for example, litres in the case of petrol or
cubic metres in the case of gas).
Each type of fossil fuel contains different proportions of carbon,
and therefore has a different emission factor. Coal emits about
twice the amount of CO2 per unit of energy released than natural
gas does, with liquid fuels falling in between. This means that a
uniform tax on carbon would translate to different amounts per
unit of measurement for each major fuel type. The following
table sets out the carbon content, in tonnes, per gigajoule of
energy output.
Tonnes of carbon per GJ7
gas coal petrol diesel fuel oil
0.014 0.027 0.020 0.020 0.020
Charging for emissions and paying for absorption?
A carbon charge could be designed as a “one-sided instrument”,
which would simply tax CO2 emissions, or a “two-sided
instrument”, which would also reward carbon absorption. Given
the aim of reducing net CO2 emissions, a two-sided instrument
would, in theory, be better targeted. It could ensure that if an
increase in absorption cost less than the same reduction in
emissions, the absorption, not the reduction in emissions, would
take place.
However, a two-sided charge would be expensive to administer.
It would require an administrative system that could estimate
the changes in CO2 absorption when land uses changed; for
example, from agriculture to planted forestry. With a low-level
charge, the additional administrative costs of a two-sided charge
compared to a one-sided charge are likely to exceed the additional
benefits. Therefore, the preferred approach is a one-sided charge.
DESIGN PRINCIPLES
7 New Zealand Energy Information
Handbook, Baines, J. (1993).A WORKING PAPER  13
Principles of tax policy
Economic efficiency, simplicity, fairness and certainty are
important principles in the design of taxes. Tax reforms over
the last decade have, in general, reflected these principles.
Examples are the broadening of the tax base, the lowering of
income-tax rates, and the lack of exemptions and special rates
for GST.
However, a carbon charge, like a limited range of other taxes
such as alcohol and tobacco excises, has a different purpose.
While the principles of simplicity, fairness and certainty still
apply, the economic efficiency issues for such taxes are not
identical to those for taxes that aim to raise revenue. Revenue-
raising taxes are aimed at minimising their impact on people’s
behaviour, while taxes such as a carbon charge are aimed at
changing it. Their purpose is to ‘correctly’ price goods that, in
their use, impose otherwise unpriced costs on society. They
achieve this by incorporating the cost on society into the price
of the good. In the case of carbon, the unpriced cost is human-
induced climate change. A carbon charge equal to the unpriced
cost of pollution would result in emission levels that were optimal
from society’s viewpoint.
A uniform or differentiated charge?
A charge could apply at a uniform rate to all carbon-containing
substances that emit CO2 when used, or there could be
exemptions or different rates for different substances or uses. A
uniform charge on all carbon that is introduced into the economy
and released in it as CO2 is the preferred approach. Uniformity
would mean that all abatement opportunities would be treated
equally across and within all sectors.
On the other hand, particular sources or uses of carbon could
be exempted from a charge, or subject to a higher or lower rate.
Examples of non-uniform approaches include:
• exempting carbon that contributes to existing emission levels
(that is, ‘grandparenting’);
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• placing a higher charge on those who can more readily reduce
their emissions; and
• taking account of emission reductions already in place under
voluntary agreements.
The arguments for and against uniformity are set out below.
Uniform
A uniform charge would achieve a given reduction in CO2
emissions at a lower economic cost than a non-uniform charge
would. Therefore, it would usually be the preferred approach.8
This is because:
• emitters would have an equal incentive to find and apply the
lowest-cost methods of reducing their emissions, so that
lower-cost reductions (up to the level of the charge) are
implemented rather than higher-cost ones;
• all emitters would have the same incentives to use all potential
methods of reducing emissions, encouraging a mix of
voluntary, lowest-cost responses across industries;
• a uniform approach provides fewer opportunities for lobbying
or strategic behaviour than a non-uniform approach; and
• it does not discriminate against new entrants.
With a uniform rate, emitters face a common charge per tonne
for emitting CO2 and respond by reducing their emissions until
the cost of reduction reaches that price. For example, with a
$10 per tonne charge, emitters would undertake all abatement
measures costing less than $10 per tonne. This would not lead
to equal or proportional responses by all emitters, because some
would be more price responsive than others. The incentive effect
of a uniform rate would lead different firms to reduce pollution
to different degrees - those with high reduction costs would
reduce their use of carbon less than others and therefore obtain
a smaller reduction in their carbon tax.
The advantage of uniformity would be that the introduction of
more carbon into the economy would incur the same additional
cost in all sectors. Everyone would then have to recover that
DESIGN PRINCIPLES
8 The Theory of Environmental Policy,
Second Edition, 1988, Baumol,
William and Oates, Wallace,
Chapter 11.  Sustain-ability and
Policy: Limits to Economics (1995),
Common, Michael, (page 161)
comments that, given certain
standard assumptions, “the least
cost theorem says that abatement
costs are minimised where [the
Government] taxes emissions
from all firms at a uniform rate
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cost when pricing the goods produced using the carbon. All
carbon uses that had a higher value than their cost, including
the carbon charge, would be unaffected by a carbon charge. In
other words, all high-value uses of carbon would be retained
and low-value uses would be reduced. Thus, uniformity would
minimise the cost to the economy as a whole of achieving a given
reduction in CO2 emissions.
A uniform carbon charge that does not differentiate between
sources or emitters is a policy solution consistent with the nature
of the underlying problem: that is, the failure of market prices
to include the environmental costs of CO2 emissions. A uniform
charge would aim to partially incorporate the cost of the
emissions directly into market prices, based on the carbon content
of the goods. Producers and consumers would then be
encouraged to adjust their behaviour accordingly. A non-
uniform charge, on the other hand, would send different signals
about the environmental costs to different emitters.
More generally, a uniform charge is a ‘transparent’ policy: the
same rate applies to all sectors, without the complication of
different rates and/or exemptions.
Differentiated
Arguments against uniformity normally focus on the specific
circumstances of particular firms or industries. The advantages
commonly presented of a non-uniform approach are given on
the following page, with some suggested approaches under each
heading.
Flexibility
1. Industries that are most able to reduce their emissions
(whether due to the size of their emissions or their technical
flexibility in using carbon) should face a higher charge, to
encourage them to make maximum use of that ability.
2. Industries that are least able to reduce their emissions should
face a higher charge, in line with the theory of ‘Ramsey
taxation’ of commodities. This says that the economic costs
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of collecting revenue can be minimised by setting the rate of
the tax on each individual inversely to the extent that his or
her behaviour changes in response to price changes. This
minimises the behavioural response to the tax and the
resulting distortions to the economy.
3. Industries that face technological limits on reducing their
emissions should face a lower charge, since a higher charge
would make little or no difference to their emission levels.
4. A charge should be higher on the largest CO2 emitters or
industries, to encourage them to reduce their emissions first.
Impacts
1. Firms or industries that would face a greater relative cost
increase from a charge than others should face a lower charge.
2. Firms or industries that would reduce employment or
investment following the imposition of a charge should face
a lower charge.
3. Firms or industries that would be likely to relocate overseas,
reducing emissions within New Zealand but possibly
increasing them elsewhere, should face a lower charge.
4. Firms or industries in regions that may be particularly affected
by a charge should face a lower charge.
Fairness
1. Existing levels of emission should be exempted under a
‘grandparenting’ provision. Some emitters may have already
achieved some or all cost-effective reductions voluntarily
before the introduction of a charge, and so should be exempt
from it.9
2. If a uniform charge were implemented without
comprehensive multilateral action, New Zealand firms would
face a charge while some international competitors would
not. Such firms should be exempted or a lower charge




agreements are in place, including
one facilitating agreement where
an intermediary will arrange
agreements with small firms
within an industry.  These
agreements are not binding.A WORKING PAPER  17
The Preferred Approach
A general response to the arguments against uniformity is that
differentiating among emitters would not reduce emissions in
New Zealand at the lowest cost to New Zealand.
As an example, assume that Emitter A is more easily able to
reduce CO2 emissions. Emitter A faces a carbon charge of $200
per tonne and Emitter B faces a charge of $100 per tonne. This
gives Emitter A the incentive to spend up to $200 per tonne to
reduce emissions, while Emitter B has the incentive to spend up
to only $100 per tonne. A uniform, intermediate-level charge
on both emitters would achieve the same reduction in emissions
at a lower economic cost, because Emitter A would back off
making reductions and Emitter B would increase them.10 This
would happen regardless of the level of emissions or the size of
the firm, or whether emissions have already been reduced
voluntarily. The example below shows that the cost of reducing
emissions is lower with a uniform charge than with charges
aimed at achieving equal reductions by each firm, or charges
from which some are exempt. It also shows that the distribution
of winners and losers differs according to the type of charge
used.
In the example, there are three firms, whose emission reduction
costs per tonne vary. Three methods of reduction are used:
1. Uniform charge. With this charge, each emitter undertakes
all reduction measures that cost less than $20.
2. Differentiated charge aimed at equal reductions by each
firm. With this charge, each emitter undertakes equal
reductions in absolute terms.
3. Charge with exemption. With this charge, one emitter is
exempt, and all the others undertake equal reductions in
absolute terms.
To illustrate the effects of these methods, we assume an objective
of reducing CO2 emissions by 300 tonnes overall.
DESIGN PRINCIPLES
10 This example is discussed in
“Timing, Distribution and
Impacts of Carbon Taxes”,
NZIER report to Ministry of
Commerce, S Gale, May 1995,
page 13.  It is not a technically
precise example, but illustrates
the effect of uniformity versus
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Reductions of CO
2 emissions achieved (in tonnes) at given
costs per tonne
$10 $20 $50 $75
Firm A 100 150 200 250
Firm B 10 50 100 150
Firm C 50 100 200 300
Method One - uniform charge
Marginal cost Total cost Reduction
Firm A $20 $3000 150t
Firm B $20 $1000 50t
Firm C $20 $2000 100t
Total 300t
Average cost: $20.00/tonne of CO2 reduction
Method Two - uniform quantity
Marginal cost Total cost Reduction
Firm A $10 $1000 100t
Firm B $50 $5000 100t
Firm C $20 $2000 100t
Total 300t
Average Cost: $26.27/tonne of CO2 reduction
Method Three - exemption
Marginal cost Total cost Reduction
Firm A $20 $3000 150t
Firm B $75 $11250 150t
Firm C $0 $0 0t
Total 300t
Average cost: $47.50/tonne of CO2 reduction
Exemptions or lower charges would also create a longer-term
problem of “lock-in”. Once preferential arrangements were in
place they would become difficult to change, and the firms
concerned would have no incentive for technological innovationA WORKING PAPER  19
that might remove the original reason for the preference.
Further, favouring existing firms or sectors would, in effect, raise
barriers for new entrants or more efficient users of carbon, thus
reducing competition and efficiency. In the longer run, this would
increase a charge’s economic costs to New Zealand.
Flexibility
There is an intuitive appeal to the idea of imposing a higher
charge on those with the most potential to achieve reductions,
so that they are encouraged to do so. However, this does not
necessarily work in practice.
With a uniform charge, everyone faces the same incentives. A
uniform charge would usually result in the most flexible firms
making the greatest reductions, but would not prejudge which
firms or sectors are most flexible. Adjusting a charge on a case-
by-case basis to reflect each individual firm’s or sector’s ability
to adjust its carbon use would require detailed information that
the government would not have, and encourage firms and
sectors to claim inflexibility in order to qualify for a lower charge.
Ramsey taxation, as noted above, aims to raise revenue but cause
minimal behavioural change. This approach is inappropriate
for a charge that is intended to change behaviour rather than to
raise revenue.
Impacts
A uniform charge would directly increase the price of carbon
and, therefore, the cost of CO2 emissions. Increasing the relative
price of carbon would have an economic cost in GDP terms,
and would reduce CO2 emissions, which would not be accounted
for in GDP. The production and consumption mix of the
economy would change, creating both ‘winners’ and ‘losers’
among firms. There may also be a competitive disadvantage for
some New Zealand firms in relation to overseas firms.
Part of the response to a carbon charge would include a
reduction in the output of some firms and possibly the closure
of some marginal firms. However, exempting firms from a
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carbon charge would simply shift the burden onto others. The
wider the exemption, the greater the additional costs would be.
The general principle is that, to achieve a given level of reduction
in emissions, any reduction of cost for one emitter would mean
an increased cost for others11. These costs may not be apparent
if they are dispersed, but the exemptions would still increase
the economic cost to New Zealand as a whole12 because they
would represent a departure from uniformity.
If New Zealand imposed a carbon charge unilaterally, this
would reduce the international competitiveness of some firms.
Some emitting activities may relocate overseas, leading to
increased emissions overseas. Thus global CO2 emissions would
be reduced to a lesser extent than the reduction of emissions in
New Zealand (or not at all) as a result of unilateral action by
New Zealand. However, this working paper is considering the
design of a carbon charge which would reduce New Zealand’s
national emissions at least cost. The issue of unilateral versus
multilateral action by a range of countries to reduce CO2
emissions is being considered in international negotiations on
climate change. In these negotiations New Zealand is advocating
a least-cost flexible approach involving multilateral mechanisms.
Fairness
Differentiation in charges would raise issues of fairness. Any
non-uniform approach benefits particular firms or sectors on
grounds other than national benefit. Arguably, this is unfair,
since, as noted above, others would bear a greater burden to
achieve any given reduction. The same could be said about
applying the carbon charge only to additional emissions; that
is, grandparenting existing emissions.
A variation on the grandparenting argument is that it should
apply to firms that have already reduced emissions under
voluntary agreements. However, as well as creating a distorting
effect on competition (by exempting established firms), this
would cause problems, such as high compliance and
administrative costs, in establishing which emissions are
DESIGN PRINCIPLES
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short term, a carbon charge
would not lead to emission
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there is always some opportunity
for technological change that
could reduce emission levels for
a given level of output, or for
some measure of substitution
between the carbon-containing
inputs and/or outputs of the firm
or sector in question, and the
inputs and/or outputs of other
firms or sectors.
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genuinely additional. Such grandparenting arrangements can
distort markets for a long time, with pricing decisions largely
driven by previous, government-set prices.
It would be impossible for the government to obtain reliable
information on the impact of voluntary agreements; for example:
• whether firms would have undertaken emission reduction
measures in the absence of a carbon charge;
• the degree to which emission reduction measures have been
brought forward to help achieve climate change objectives;
and
• the extent to which firms have exhausted the potential for
achieving emission reductions.
It is worth noting that measures firms have undertaken under
voluntary agreements have already reduced their potential
liability from a carbon charge, since their lower emission levels
would incur a lower charge.
The issue of the imposition of a charge on New Zealand firms,
while some overseas competitors may not be taxed, raises the
broader question of the international co-ordination of policy
responses to climate change, as noted in the preceding section.
This Working Paper does not consider this broader question.
However, whether or not overseas competitors face some form
of carbon tax, a uniform carbon charge would reduce CO2
emissions in New Zealand at less cost than a non-uniform
approach.
Administration
Most varieties of non-uniformity, if feasible at all, would need
complex and costly administrative arrangements. Varying the
rate of a charge on the basis of technical flexibility would require
information on every source’s methods of reducing emissions,
both in general terms and at every level of output. This
information would need to be continually updated to reflect
technological changes, but would be difficult or impossible for
the government to ascertain accurately. Since the rate of a
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uniform charge on given products varies only in proportion to
their carbon content, uniformity would allow a charge to be
imposed at the point of production or importation of the
products. This minimises administrative costs for the
government, and compliance costs for the introducers and users
of carbon.
Another advantage of a uniform charge over a non-uniform
charge is that it reduces the incentives for carbon-using firms or
sectors to lobby on the basis of their own interests. A uniform
charge would be a transparent instrument of environmental
policy; transparency is an important means to reduce special
treatment for particular firms or sectors.
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Summary
The suggested coverage for a carbon charge is all anthropogenic
carbon introduced into (that is, produced in or imported into)
the New Zealand economy and then released in New Zealand
in the form of CO2. This carbon includes:
• fossil fuels (including the flaring of gas and the use of
imported petroleum coke and pitch for carbon anodes used
in aluminium smelting); and
•C O 2 sources not associated with fossil fuels (for example, the
manufacture of cement and the extraction of geothermal
steam for electricity generation).
There could be exclusions from a carbon charge where:
• the carbon is exported or re-exported;
• no CO2 is emitted when the carbon is used;
• the carbon is absorbed and released as part of a natural cycle;
or
• the transaction costs (for example, administration and
compliance costs) of imposing a charge would be great
enough to outweigh the benefits of including the activity
within the regime.
It would be important to have a clear division, based on
transparent criteria, between sources of carbon that are subject
to the regime and those that are exempt.
IPCC Classification
Ideally, a uniform charge on carbon would cover all carbon
introduced into, and then released within, the New Zealand
economy. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has
issued a set of Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas
Inventories that classifies all sources and sinks of greenhouse
gases. National inventories of flows of greenhouse gases include
all emissions and removals taking place within national territories
and offshore areas over which national jurisdiction applies.
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It currently excludes bunker fuel sold to ships or aircraft engaged
in international transport, although these emissions are
reported.
The categories used are:
• energy;
• industrial processes;
• solvents and other products containing volatile organic
compounds;
• agriculture;
• land use change and forestry;
• waste; and
• other (non-specified) sources.
Fossil fuels
This working paper suggests that all fossil fuels in New Zealand
would be subject to a carbon charge.
Fossil fuels are the major sources of CO2 emissions. In 1995, they
represented 96.5 percent of New Zealand’s gross anthropogenic
emissions of CO2. The breakdown by fuel is as follows:
Oil: 50 percent
Combustion 48 percent
Use of electrodes for iron and steel manu-
facture, and of carbon anodes (made from
petroleum coke and liquid pitch) in the
Tiwai Point Smelter13 2 percent
Gas: 29.5 percent
Combustion14 28 percent
Flaring at wellheads15, and CO2 stripping
at the Kapuni Gas Treatment Plant (with
some subsequent reuse) 1 percent
Production of hydrogen at the Marsden
Point refinery 0.5 percent
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pure carbon cathodes. These are
imported and do not result in
emissions, so the regime would
exclude them. The steel-making
process at BHP New Zealand
Steel also results in CO2 emissions
from the consumption of carbon-
based electrodes in two
electrically powered melters and
in the arc furnace used to melt
scrap. Pacific Steel Ltd also uses
an electric arc furnace to melt
steel scrap, with carbon in the
charge combined with oxygen to
produce steel with a required
carbon content.
14 Including production and
combustion of methanol and
liquid fuels produced from gas.
15 Such as for well testing, or where
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Coal: 15 percent
Combustion 11 percent
Use of coal to remove oxygen from iron-
sand at the Glenbrook steel mill 6 percent
A charge would cover all these fuels when they are first
introduced into the New Zealand economy.
A charge would not apply to fuels manufactured in
New Zealand, since it would already have been levied at an
earlier stage. Such fuels include synthetic petrol or methanol
(manufactured by Methanex at Motonui), hydrogen peroxide
(manufactured by DuPont at Morrinsville) and hydrogen
(manufactured at Marsden Point). In all these cases, the
feedstock is gas or oil that would already have been taxed at
production or importation.
However, if the fuels were manufactured overseas and imported
into New Zealand, a charge would apply to the refined product
on importation. Apart from transport fuels, refined products
that could be imported include bitumen, carbon black, lubricating
oils, petroleum coke and pitch. Any such products manufactured
in New Zealand would incur a charge on the basis of their raw
materials, so imports should also be subject to a charge, to ensure
total coverage. Conversely, if domestic production would receive
a refund or rebate of a charge, the corresponding imports should
be exempted from it. See “Non-emitting uses”, pages 27-28,
“Activities excluded on cost-benefit grounds”, page 29, and
“Payment, refund and rebate arrangements”, page 37.
Carbon sources not associated with fossil fuels
Non-fossil fuel sources of carbon would also be subject to a
charge.
Such sources accounted for 3.5 percent of gross emissions in
1995. They would require a different charging mechanism to
that used for other carbon introducers, because they are solely
domestically produced and not all uses convert all the carbon
input into CO2 emissions. A charge would apply not to
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production, but to certain uses only; for example, to the
calcination of limestone to make cement, but not to the
construction of a road with limestone.
The only significant examples of CO2-emitting uses that are not
associated with fossil fuels are:
The calcination of limestone in the process
of manufacturing cement 16 1.8 percent
The calcination of limestone in the process
of manufacturing lime17 0.3 percent
The use of limestone in steel production18 0.1 percent
The release of CO2 as part of steam extracted
from geothermal fields for electricity
generation
19 1.3 percent
Note: There may be other CO2-emitting industrial processes that
have not yet been identified.
Exclusions from a carbon charge
Exports and re-exports
Exports and re-exports of fossil fuels would be exempt from a
carbon charge.
The target of a charge would be CO2 emissions within the
New Zealand economy. This implies that a charge on the export
or re-export of fossil fuels would be refunded or rebated. On the
other hand, if the production of the fuel involved the emission
of carbon, the refund would not be payable because the
emissions would have occurred in New Zealand.
The treatment of international aviation and marine bunker fuels
is currently being considered by the parties to the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change on a multilateral
basis. In the meantime, by international agreement, these fuels,
as exports, would not incur a carbon charge. However, bunker
fuel unloaded from ships would incur a charge as an import
because it emits CO2, either directly or as waste fuel oil, which
can be burned in kilns.
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which cement is made. Calcium
carbonate (CaCO3) from
limestone is heated to form
calcium oxide (CaO, or lime) and
carbon dioxide (CO2). This
process is called calcination.
Limestone often also includes
magnesium carbonate  (MgCO
3),
which has similar emissions.
Cement can also include a small
proportion of limestone filler that
is not calcinated.
17 Lime is produced in a similar
manner to cement clinker.
18 In BHP New Zealand Steel’s
multiple hearth furnaces at
Glenbrook.  The estimate is
indicative only.
19 Extraction of steam from bores,
not underground heat exchange
within bores, or natural
geothermal effects.  The CO2
content of gas emissions is
measured from samples taken at
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Non-emitting uses
A refund or rebate would apply to non-emitting uses of carbon;
that is, where the CO2 is ‘fixed’ in such a form that it is not
normally released during the product’s life. This mainly applies
to the embedding of refined petroleum products in end-
products.
20
Examples of non-emitting uses are:
• sparging; that is, the injection of CO2 (previously stripped
from natural gas) with calcium oxide to form a limestone
lining on wastewater pipes; and
• the re-injection of gas into wells. If the re-injection takes place
before the point where the tax is collected, no charge would
be levied. If the re-injection occurs after the point where the
tax is collected, a rebate should be made.
There are some uses of carbon-containing substances that cannot
be simply classified as emitters or non-emitters. These uses may:
• emit some but not all of the embodied carbon as CO2;
• emit embodied carbon as CO2 but only over a long period of
time; or
• emit CO2 only in some circumstances.
Whether such uses should incur a charge will need to be
considered on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the
significance of CO2 emissions and the administrative and
compliance costs of including or excluding the uses concerned.
Examples of these uses are:
Tyres About 25 to 35 percent of a tyre is made from carbon
black, which is made from the oxidisation of natural
gas or from the residual hydrocarbons from oil
refining. The small proportion of tyre material that
is deposited on roads oxidises, thereby releasing CO2.
Common disposal methods such as landfills also
release CO2, but only over a very long period. Further
investigation would be needed to consider whether
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the long-term release of CO2 from disposed tyres is
significant enough to justify their inclusion in the
carbon charge regime.
Bitumen This is produced by distillation of the lowest fraction
of crude oil. Some proportion of the carbon embodied
in bitumen is released in the form of carbon
monoxide (CO) or methane (CH4). Since some carbon
is fixed in the bitumen and no CO2 is released, a
carbon charge rebate would seem justified.
Plastic Plastics are manufactured from resin that contains
a small proportion of carbon. The manufacture, use,
recycling and disposal of plastics does not, in general,
involve the emission of CO2, suggesting that a charge
should not be levied on resin. However, plastics may
be combusted, which does involve the emission of
CO2. Combustion is not a significant method of
disposing of plastics at present but, if it were to
become more common, consideration would need
to be given to a charge on resin.
Carbon absorbed and released as part of a short-term
natural cycle
A charge would not apply to carbon that is released as part of
short-term natural cycles such as the harvesting and replanting
of forests, because the CO2 emitted is offset by carbon absorption.
Carbon is released in this way when, for example:
• trees are harvested and burned;
• plant matter decomposes;
• methane from landfills is burnt; and
• sugar is fermented in beer production.
A ‘one-sided’ regime (that is, one that taxed carbon release but
made no payments for carbon absorption) would generate
perverse incentives in this area. Taxing the CO2 released in such
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circumstances without giving a credit for the initial carbon
absorption (for example, when trees are planted) would
discourage that initial absorption phase, which is undesirable.
Activities excluded on cost-benefit grounds
The regime would not cover sources of carbon where the
administration and compliance costs of imposing a charge would
be likely to exceed the benefits. If a charge were set at a higher-
level, such exclusions might be reviewed.
One-off land-use changes fall into this category, as may the
emission of carbon from tyres, bitumen and plastics. See “Non-
emitting uses”, page 27-28.
Conclusion
A charge would apply to all carbon that is introduced into the
economy from:
Fossil fuels, whether produced here or imported (including
flaring of gas at wells).
Other sources - industrial processes that result in CO2 emissions,
such as the calcination of limestone and the extraction of steam
from geothermal fields.
A charge would not apply:
• where carbon is introduced into, but not released within, the
economy; for example, in the case of:
- exports, and international aviation and marine bunker fuels
- non-emitting (that is, ‘carbon fixing’) uses;
• where carbon is absorbed and released within a natural cycle.
This applies to:
- renewable sources (biomass)
- landfill gas generation; or
• to activities currently excluded on cost-benefit grounds. These
include minor emitters of carbon, such as plastics.
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Summary
This section discusses implementation of a carbon charge, if the
Government decided to implement such a charge. The aim would
be to minimise the total costs associated with the introduction
and ongoing operation of an effectively administered carbon
charge. These costs include payers’ compliance costs and the
government’s administrative costs.
The main issues are:
• how to determine the carbon content, amount of CO2 emitted
per unit of energy generated (calorific value), and emission
factors of the products subject to a charge. The preferred
approach would be to measure the carbon content rather
than estimate it, wherever possible;
• where to set the point at which liability for a charge arises;
and
• administrative and transitional issues such as:
- payment, refund or rebate arrangements for exports and
carbon-fixing activities;
- auditing and enforcement;
- compliance costs;
- the use of thresholds; and
- the effect on existing contracts.
Determining carbon content, calorific values and
emission factors
Imposing a carbon charge on a product requires knowledge of
its carbon content and calorific value, so that an emission factor
can be calculated for it.
Agreed methodologies would be established for obtaining this
information. The preferred methodology would be to actually
measure the carbon content and calorific values, with estimation
of these where measurement is not feasible or cost-effective. The
key factors in deciding on other, second-best, methodologies
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would be cost, the accuracy of the proposed methodology, and
the variability of carbon content and calorific value in the
product.
Both of these approaches - actually measuring carbon content
and calorific value, and using other methodologies - would
require striking a balance between the level of compliance costs
and the effectiveness of the regime.
Once an agreed methodology for determining the carbon content
and calorific values and for calculating the emission factors was
in place, ongoing monitoring of production would be
comparatively simple, with payers of a charge calculating their
liability by multiplying the emission factor per unit of the product
by the quantity produced or imported.
The following table sets out the carbon contents, calorific values
and emission factors of the main fossil fuels.
Carbon CO2 emissions CO2 emissions
content  per unit of per standard unit
energy* of measurement
Gas natural gas 69% 52.6 2.1 kg /m3
Oil petrol 86% 66.6 2.3 kg /l
diesel 86% 68.7 2.6 kg /l
aviation fuel 87% 68.7 2.5 kg /l
fuel oil 88% 73.7 3.0 kg /l
LPG 82% 60.4 1.6 kg /l
Coal bituminous 78% 88.8 2.9 t /t
sub-bituminous 56% 91.2 2.1 t /t
lignite 39% 95.2 1.4 t /t
average 62% 90.4 2.3 t /t
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The most appropriate categories for determining the carbon
content of the different products would probably be:
• For fossil fuels:
- each oil and gas field;
- each standard grade of coal (narrower grades would
probably be required than are presently used);
- each category of crude oil; and
- each type of refined petroleum product, including non-
fuel petroleum products (for example, lubricating oil,
petroleum coke, pitch and carbon black)21.
• For other carbon sources:
- each limestone quarry or cement works; and
- each geothermal field.
Actual measurement
Actual measurement of carbon content and calorific values is
the preferred approach, wherever it would be cost-effective.
For domestic production of petroleum, the carbon contents and
calorific values of the various oil, gas and condensate streams
could be measured at or near the wellhead.
Major producers of coal already regularly measure the
characteristics of production, and these tests could cover carbon
content and calorific value also. Smaller producers may be
subject to less rigorous requirements. CO2 is already measured
at major geothermal energy sites through sampling of gas
emitted.
For imports and exports, it may be necessary to measure the
actual carbon content and calorific value of each cargo. This is
unlikely to be a significant issue for gas, given the low level of
external trade and the uniform carbon content of traded gas.
However, it may be a significant issue for exports and imports
of coal or oil. In the case of oil, exports and imports are both in
standard grades. If the grades are sufficiently accurate,
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certification of the carbon content by exporters or importers may
be the most cost-efficient approach. For coal, each cargo may
have to be sampled.
Other methodologies
Estimation methodologies would be used where measurement
of the actual carbon content or calorific value was not cost-
effective. This could apply to products as a whole or to specific
sources only, such as small coal mines, bunker waste and small
imports of petroleum products.
The point at which liability arises
To administer a carbon charge, it would be important to establish
a legally-binding point at which the carbon content of the
product and the level of production could be determined, and
at which it would be clear who would be liable for a carbon
charge. The preferred approach would be that a charge would
apply to domestic sources of carbon at the production, not the
consumption, stage, and to imports in the same way as current
tariffs and excises.
The main decision is whether to levy a charge when the product
is produced or imported, or when it is consumed. When making
the decision, the effects on the following areas should be taken
into account:
Imports
If a consumption-based approach were adopted, no separate
regime for imports would be required.
Under a production-based approach, imports could be handled
quite simply by levying a charge when the product leaves the
point of entry (a “customs-controlled area” under the Customs
and Excise Act 1996).
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Coverage
A consumption-based charge would not cover transformation
losses, such as from crude oil refining at Marsden Point or from
the production of methanol.
A production-based charge would be an incentive to modify
processes to minimise transformation losses. Such an approach
(together with charging for domestically produced oil at the
production stage) would ensure that transformation losses (such
as petroleum products used at Marsden Point itself) were subject
to a charge.
Pricing
In competitive markets, the point at which a charge would be
applied does not alter the distribution of those who bear the
cost. The point chosen, therefore, should be the one that would
most effectively achieve the policy objectives and minimise
administrative costs.
Administration
There are far fewer producers and importers than consumers.
Targeting the point of production or importation means there
are fewer collection points, lower administrative costs and risks
of evasion, and possibly lower compliance costs if existing
revenue and monitoring points are used.
A production-based charge would require a regime for refunding
or rebating a charge for non-emitting uses, and for exports and
bunker fuels. The implications for contractual arrangements
between different firms in the production process may also have
to be considered.
A charge at the consumption stage would avoid the need for
refunds or rebates.
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Product features
Electricity is generated from coal, gas, and geothermal and hydro
sources; motor fuels are derived from gas and oil. Under current
industry structures and technologies, it is not feasible to levy
separate charges at the consumer level for electricity and motor
fuels on the basis of the feedstock. Therefore, a tax on electricity
or motor fuels as the final products of CO2-emitting energy
sources would give no price incentive to consume electricity or
to derive motor fuels from a source that emits less CO2 per unit
of energy produced. This suggests that the tax should apply to
the energy feedstock, not the final energy form.
In the light of these considerations, the preferred approach, in
general, would be to apply a carbon charge at the production
or importation stage; that is:
• for imports, at the border. A charge would operate in the
same manner as existing excises and tariffs; and
• for the domestic production of fossil fuels, at the well or mine.
In order to ensure the effectiveness of the regime, a charge
would apply to fossil fuels either leaving the mine or wellhead,
or used on site. This would ensure that stockpiles were
covered, minimising the transition period and preventing
stockpiling in anticipation of a carbon charge. In the case of
gas, separate measurement points might be required for the
different components of output such as condensate and gas,
and for flaring.
An exception would apply in the case of limestone, which has a
number of uses. Of these uses, only the manufacture of steel
and the production of lime cause CO2 emissions. This suggests
that a charge should be levied where the limestone enters the
steel and lime production processes.
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Administrative and transitional issues
Payment, refund and rebate arrangements
The handling of payments, refunds and rebates is a technical
issue. Using existing procedures would minimise costs to the
government and firms.
Payments
Wherever feasible, it would be desirable to use the same payment
arrangements as for existing tariffs and excises. Payment
frequencies may vary according to the size of the expected
liability, as they do for GST and excises.
Refunds and rebates
The regime would contain provisions for refunding or rebating
a charge where any product that has directly incurred a charge
is exported or applied to a non-emitting use.
As noted in the section on coverage, some sources of carbon
would be exempt from a carbon charge. This simply means that
the regime does not need to cover them. However, there would
also be exempt uses of carbon - exports and re-exports,
international aviation and marine bunker fuels, and non-emitting
uses.22 These exempt uses would be likely to draw on non-exempt
sources of carbon.
In these cases, arrangements would be required to reverse
payments made as a result of a carbon charge. In theory, there
are two ways to accomplish this:
• rebating payments at production; or
• refunding payments at export of the product, or at the point
where the carbon is fixed.
Where it is the producer who puts the carbon source to a non-
emitting use, the first approach would be taken. However, it
could be difficult to know at the production stage what the final
use of the carbon-containing product would be. In this case,
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only the second approach is feasible. The New Zealand Customs
Service uses both approaches, both rebate and refund, in
administering excises on tobacco, alcohol and petrol.
The rebate or refund approach is fully consistent with the
objective of a carbon charge, since it would make uses that do
not involve emissions of CO2 in New Zealand cheaper than uses
that do. It could be perceived as unfair that refunds would often
be made to parties that did not make the original payment (this
would not happen with rebates, which go to the person originally
making payments). However, large purchasers may come to an
agreement with sellers to share the burden of a charge and
benefit of a refund, or the agreed price for the good might
incorporate the cost of a charge. Indeed, if sellers fully
incorporated a charge in their price and the refund were paid
to purchasers, the net effect on both parties would be nil.
Auditing and enforcement
It would be desirable to use existing types of audit arrangements
wherever feasible. The precise arrangements would depend on
the administrative structure of a charge and its compatibility
with existing audit arrangements.
It would also be desirable to draw on existing legislation and
administrative procedures for audit and enforcement. This
would include the definition of offences, the setting of penalties
comparable to those applying to similar tariffs and excises, and
disputes resolution. The objective would be to encourage
compliance through a co-operative approach.
Whether new, specific provisions are required in these areas
would depend on which agency would administer a charge,
and the extent to which existing provisions could be used.
Compliance costs
Compliance costs are the costs to businesses and individuals of
meeting an obligation to government. They are distinct from
the direct costs of the requirement, such as the carbon charge
payable.
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A carbon charge would impose additional compliance costs on
those who are potentially liable for a charge. The significance of
these costs would differ according to the industry and the size
of firm. The administrative arrangements may therefore require
some tailoring.
The design proposed seeks to use existing procedures to minimise
compliance costs, while retaining a robust regime. This inevitably
involves trade-offs between compliance costs and effectiveness.
Thresholds
The regime should contain provisions for applying thresholds,
in value terms, below which a charge and refunds would not
apply. Whether such provisions are used in practice would
depend on the particular circumstances.
Applying thresholds for the application of a charge and refunds
would reduce compliance costs. Setting them would involve a
trade-off between effectiveness and practicality, which could
change as the level of a charge changed. If a standard threshold
(in value terms) were used, administrative and compliance costs,
which are likely to be broadly similar across industries, would
be minimised.
Thresholds would probably be irrelevant for oil and gas
production or imports, because these are usually carried out on
a large scale and accurate measurement of quantities is standard.
They may be relevant for:
• some coal mines. However, although many mines are small,
coal has a high carbon content, so that even a low dollar
threshold would exclude very few mines;
• small imports of petroleum products; and
• minor flaring at wellheads.
Thresholds would be appropriate for refunds or rebates, given
the cost to the government of verifying the nature and size of
the carbon-fixing activities. Alternatively, refunds or rebates
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could be available to anyone willing to go to the expense of self-
verification. This may depend on the likely costs of approving
and monitoring such activities.
If thresholds were used, careful attention would need to be given
to balancing compliance costs with the potential for evasion and
the effectiveness of the regime. Where a domestic carbon source
is exempted on the basis of compliance costs, there would have
to be measures to protect the integrity of the rebate/refund
system. Without such measures, firms could, for example, receive
a refund or rebate on a product that had not borne any charge
to begin with.
Effect on existing contracts
The preferred approach would be for the Government not to
include in carbon-charge legislation provisions to override fixed-
price contracts to ensure that a charge would be passed on.
Some contracts for the supply of goods subject to a charge would
be long-term and would have fixed-price provisions. Such
provisions could temporarily (for the duration of the contract)
prevent the carbon charge from being passed on to the users,
delaying its effect on emissions. If it chose to do so, the
government could legislate to ensure that a charge was passed
on regardless.
Long-term contracts are a mechanism by which commercial
parties share the risks associated with unforeseen events. A major
aspect of long-term contracts is the allocation of risks associated
with price changes. Some contracts allocate the risk of a new
tax to the buyer, by including a provision stating that the buyer
will pay the cost associated with any new tax. Fixed-price
contracts, on the other hand, allocate this risk to the seller. These
different risk allocations are part of the efficient operation of
markets over time.
Further, changing contracts through legislation would suggest
that the government is willing to override the provisions of
privately-agreed commercial arrangements. This would damage
New Zealand’s reputation as a country to do business in and
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make long-term contracts a less reliable vehicle for commercial
relationships. It would also add to the uncertainty already
created by the imposition of a new charge. All this would make
commercial parties less willing to enter into efficiency-enhancing
long-term contracts.
These considerations suggest that the government should be wary
about overriding the provisions of contracts that commercial
parties have voluntarily entered into. Accordingly, the preferred
approach would be for the Government not to legislate to
override the price provisions of fixed-price contracts.
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Summary
A carbon charge would need to be enacted by a stand-alone
piece of legislation. Standard practice would be used to divide
the necessary provisions between legislation and regulations.
The legislation would provide for, or authorise regulations to
provide for:
• the imposition of a charge on products containing carbon,
and the setting of the rate;
• procedures for determining carbon content, and setting the
point at which a charge applies;
• the circumstances in which refunds or rebates can apply; and
• administrative arrangements (for example, provision for data
collection, audit, offences, penalties and dispute resolution)
where provisions in existing legislation do not apply.
A carbon charge would be added to the price of products before
GST was charged and would be tax deductible for businesses.
Legislative design
The preferred approach would be to use a stand-alone piece of
legislation to establish any charge, with references to existing
legislation for administrative and enforcement provisions, and
with regulations detailing coverage and measurement
procedures.
Existing Act or new legislation?
The regime could be implemented by a stand-alone Act or by
the use of similar, existing legislation.
The legislative options are to:
• incorporate it into existing legislation for revenue collection.
This would recognise the fact that a charge is a tax;
• incorporate it into the Resource Management Act. This would
recognise that a charge has an environmental purpose; or
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• create a new, stand-alone piece of legislation. This would
recognise a charge’s special nature as an environmental
charge, and the possibility that other measures with the same
target, such as alternative economic instruments, may be set
in the future.
The major categories of Acts currently in place that impose taxes
or duties (excluding user charges and local body rates) are:
• Taxes on goods and services: the Goods and Services Tax Act
1985, the Customs and Excise Act 1996 (petrol, alcohol and
tobacco excises), and the Tariff Act 1988;
• Energy and resource levies: the Energy Resources Levy Act
1976 (on coal and gas) and the Ministry of Energy Abolition
Act 1989 (Petroleum Fuels Monitoring Levy and other levies
on mining and energy activities);
• Duties: the Stamp and Cheque Duties Act 1971, the Estate
and Gift Duties Act 1968 and the Gaming Duties Act 1971;
and
• Income tax: the Income Tax Act 1994; the Tax Administration
Act 1994, and the Taxation Review Authorities Act 1994.
The following Acts regulate emissions of pollutants:
• The Resource Management Act 1991; and
• The Ozone Layer Protection Act 1996.
The simplest approach would seem to be to create a stand-alone
Act that covers issues specific to the carbon charge, but draws
on other legislation for administrative powers. This would avoid
the need to draft duplicate administrative and enforcement
procedures.
Further, a stand-alone Act would allow a separate purpose
clause that would reflect the reasons for introducing a charge
and create a legislative framework for implementing any future
environmental instruments such as other charges or emission
permits. A stand-alone Act would also separate out the complex
measurement procedures, which are not relevant to other
legislation.
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LEGISLATION
Legislation and regulation
It would follow New Zealand’s constitutional practice to set the
rate of a carbon charge and criteria for coverage in legislation.
New Zealand constitutional practice requires taxes to be imposed
by legislation, but provides a power to make regulations about
administrative procedures. Standard principles for legislation
and regulations are that:
• tax rates are specified in legislation;
• legislative provisions that give regulation-making powers
must specify precisely what is covered;
• regulations do not amend or override legislation;
• there must be full and proper consultation on draft
regulations; and
• there must be a right of appeal on regulations that affect rights
or liberties.
Regulations would specify the precise coverage of a charge and
administrative issues such as the point where liability for it arises,
assessment of the carbon content of products, and the movement
of particular categories of exports or non-emitting uses in or out
of a refunds or rebates regime.
The content of the legislation
The legislation would need to provide for:
• legal authority to impose a charge;
• determining carbon content and setting the point at which
liability arises;
• authorising refunds or rebates; and
• administering a charge.
Authority to impose a charge
The legislation must provide the authority to collect a charge.
This authority would represent Parliament’s basic authority to
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The authority would need to cover the rate of a charge, and
criteria for bringing products within its coverage. The actual
coverage would be set in regulations, providing the flexibility to
adjust the regime as required.
A charge would be set in terms of emission factors, and then
related back to the prevailing unit of measurement in each
product. Regulations would set standard conversion factors.
Determining carbon content and setting the point at
which liability arises
The legislation would need to give the authority for regulations
to specify administrative procedures for determining the carbon
content of products to which a charge applies.
These procedures would need to be flexible.
Setting the point at which liability arises would be a technical
question, involving specific issues such as the need to include
flaring of gas, and measuring coal after screening.
Authorising refunds or rebates
The legislation would need to specify criteria for exempting
products from a charge, with the actual exemptions set in
regulations. This would provide the flexibility to adjust the
regime as required.
The criteria would focus on verifying carbon fixing or exporting,
and on whether the benefits of exemptions exceed their costs.
The provisions would need to cover a range of circumstances,
from the standard exemption for exports of fossil fuels to
procedures for determining whether a carbon-fixing activity
receives a refund or rebate.
Administering a charge
In this area, the preferred approach would be to refer to existing
legislative provisions as far as possible.
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Administrative arrangements would need to cover payment
methods, auditing, and enforcement, including offences,
penalties and disputes resolution.
The Ministry of Commerce and the New Zealand Customs
Service already hold much information on the production and
importation of carbon-containing substances. However, it is
likely that additional information would be needed, for the initial
determination of carbon content and the ongoing monitoring
of production.
Collecting, auditing and enforcing a charge are unlikely to raise
issues that are any different from those involved in existing tax
systems. This suggests that, whatever form the main legislation
may take, it could draw heavily on existing provisions for these
purposes. Standardising procedures in such areas also reduces
the room for confusion.
Interaction with other taxes
The carbon charge would interact with GST and the company
tax regime. A charge would be added to the price of the product,
which would then be subject to GST. This is consistent with the
treatment of existing excises.
A charge would be a deductible expense in businesses’ liability
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Legislation Regulations
1 Purpose To achieve least-cost reductions of
CO2 emissions from
New Zealand, consistent with our
international obligations.
2 Imposition  of  charge Charge imposed on carbon-
containing products at $X related
to emission factors, and
converted into $Y per tonne of
carbon content.
Covering only products that
contain:
−  anthropogenic carbon intro-
duced into (produced in or
imported into) the New
Zealand economy; or
−  other anthropogenic CO2
sources
where CO2 is released within
New Zealand and is not part of a
short-term natural cycle.




factors from emission factors
b a c k  t o  s t a n d a r d  u n i t s  o f
measurement for each product.
3 Refund or rebate of charge Available where:
−  the emissions occur outside
New Zealand; or
−  the use is non-emitting and
verifiable, and involves more




−  exports of fossil fuels, and
international aviation and
marine bunker fuels; and
−  non-emitting uses.
4 Measuring carbon content Hierarchy of methods:
−  measurement of actual
carbon content where feasible
and cost-effective;
−  estimated content otherwise.
Detailing products and/or
circumstances for use of each
method.
5 Point  at  which  liability  arises The closest feasible point to
production or import. More than
one point if this is necessary to
measure different components of
the product.
Delegating authority to the
service provider to set the
appropriate point in each case.





The following table summarises the provisions in legislation and regulation that would be
needed to establish a charge.
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